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KENTUCKY LAW JoURNAL

PRODUCTS LIABILITY: IS § 402A STRICT
LIABILITY REALLY STRICT IN KENTUCKY?
A manufacturer's liability for injuries to consumers has been
predicated upon several different bases, including negligence, war-

ranty, and more recently, strict liability in tort. With the adoption by
the American Law Institute of the strict liability theory in its Restatement,' this basis for recovery is gaining rapid acceptance in an increasing number of jurisdictions. While under previous theories, the
manufacturer's care in production, the consumer's privity of contract,
or the notice of breach of warranty to the manufacturer were primary
issues of fact, under a theory of strict liability these are no longer
important. The key to a manufacturer's liability lies in the existence
of a discernible defect in the product that caused the injury. While
the existence of the defect is a question of fact often hotly contested,
the identification of a defect that is caused by some malfunction in
the manufacturing process does not give rise to the conceptual
problem of defining what a defect is. If a particular product has some
quirk or variance from other products intended to be identical to it,
then the "defect" is readily discernible; and the theory of strict liability
removes from the plaintiff the necessity of showing that the quirk or
defect was caused by a lack of due care in the manufacturing process.
The problem is quite different, however, when the "defect" complained of is in the design of the product. In such a case, the product
must be shown to be defective even though it entered the stream of
commerce in exactly the form intended by the manufacturer. While
the courts could have decided that the term "defect" does not include
a product that has no traces of any mistake in the manufacturing
process and that so-called "defective designs" do not fit the definition2
of defect that causes strict liability to attach, they have not done so.
1 The present form of § 402A first appeared in Tentative Draft No. 10 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts (1964) and was the third form of the section submitted to the American Law Institute since the first appearance of § 402A in
Tentative Draft No. 6 (1961). The original version of § 402A created liability
only in the very limited case of bodily injury resulting from consumption of
defectively manufactured food. This earlier version was adopted in May, 1961, but
in an amended form. The amended form is found in Tentative Draft No. 7 (1962)
and exhibits a broadened form of liability including liability for injury resulting
from products involved in intimate bodily use, as well as for injury resulting from
consumption of defective food. Courts were expanding even beyond this; and the
American Law Institute, in an attempt to stay abreast of the rapidly changing field,
then adopted the present form of § 402A in 1964 as presented in Tentative Draft

No. 10. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
2 Wright v. Massey-Harris, 215 N.E.2d 465 (Ill. App. 1966); Stephen v. Sears
Roebuck & Co., 266 A.2d 855 (N.H. 1970); Pizza Inn, Inc. v. Tiffany, 454 S.W.2d

420 (Tex. Civ. App.

1970).

Dean Page Keeton argues strongly that this,
(Continued on next page)
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On the contrary, it has been affirmatively held that design defects give
rise to strict liability in tort.3 At the same time, however, courts are
quick to point out that such strict liability is not absolute and that
manufacturers are not intended to be insurers of users of their products. 4 Courts have assured that strict liability does not become absolute
in several different ways. They have required that the plaintiff
establish proximate cause between the injury and the alleged defect;5
that the use employed during the injury be proper, or at least foreseeable by the manufacturer; 6 and, in particular, that some demonstrable defect exist.7 It is this last requirement that has given rise
to the greatest controversy, due to the fact that there seems to be
little agreement as to specifically how a design defect is to be defined.8
Occasionally, the definition of defect in "manufacturing defect" cases
is directly applied to the "design defect" cases, and, although the
defect could be common to the entire line of defendant's products, a
defect is found only when there is a quirk or a variance in the individual product from some broad standard, such as the design most
commonly used in the industry. 9
This was the basis for a recent Kentucky decision, Jones v. Hutchinson Manufacturing Co., Inc.,'0 in which the Court of Appeals chose to
define defect as a variation from industry standards for similar products
in such a way that it was negligent to produce such a variation. In
the Jones case, the plaintiff, a five year old child, was injured when she
fell into an auger that her father, a farmer, was using to move corn
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

however, is not the better view and that "defective" should be defined in such a
way as not to include design defects. He would "limit the use of the word
'defective' to the case of an unintended condition, a miscarriage in the manufacturing
process." and
Keeton,
Manufacturer's
Meaning
of "Defect"
Manufacture
Design
of Products, 20Liability:
SYRACUsE.The
L. BEV.
559, 562
(1969). in the
3
Wright v. Massey-Harris, Inc.. 215 N.E.2d 465 (Ill. App. 1966); Berkebile
v. Brantly
Helicopter
Corp.,
281Co.,
A.2d
707N.E.2d
(Pa. Super.
Ct. 1965);
1971). Cintrone v. Hertz
182 (Ill.
210
Motor
v. White
4 Suvada
Truck Leasing & Rental Service, 212 A.2d 769 (N.J. 1965); Dippel v. Sciano, 155
v. Greenlee
N.W.2dMazzi
55 (Wis.
1967). Tool Co., 320 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1963); Valdosta CocaCola Bottling Works, Inc. v. Montgomery, 116 S.E.2d 675 (Ga. Ct. App.
1960);
Jacquot v. Win. Filene's Sons Co., 149 N.E.2d 635 (Mass. 1958); Rizzo v.
Jordan Wholesale
Co., 214 So. 2d 604 (Miss. 1968).
Kenrv. Dayton

Electric Mfg. Co., 445 S.W.2d 362 (Mo. 1969); Maiorino
v. Weco Products Co., 214
A.2d 18 (N.J. 1965).
7
States Rubber Co. v. Bauer.
3
19 F.2d 463 (8th Cir. 1963); Hill v.
Harbor Steel & Supply Corp., 132 N.W.2d 54 (Mich. 1965).
1 Justice Traynor ofCalifornia noted that there has been such a number of
varying definitions that no single definition of defect has proved adequate to
define the scope of the mnufacturer's strict liability in tort for physical injuries.
Traynor, The Was and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32
TENN. L. Rube. 63, 373 (1965).
9 Id. 369.
Ho502atS.W.2d
66 (Ky. 1973).
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from a truck into a storage elevator. Asserting that the defect was an
unsafe design, the plaintiff sued the manufacturer alleging both
negligence and strict liability. Plaintiff contended that the design was
unsafe because there were no guards to prevent the insertion of foreign
objects into the moving parts and that such guards could have
prevented her leg from becoming enmeshed in the working apparatus.
The Court resolved the issue of liability by first deciding that there
is substantially no difference between assessing liability under § 402A
of the Restatement" and assessing it under § 398, which bases liability
upon negligence.' 2 The Court held that where the defect complained
of is unsafe design, the standard of conduct required of the defendant
is reasonable care in the development of the design and that absent
a showing that the defendant was negligent, he will not be held
liable.' 3 In holding that a design is defective only when negligently
produced, the Court seems to be struggling to define what a defect is,
in order that courts can determine when a defect exists and when it
does not. Such a definition is necessitated by the requirement that the
plaintiff show a defect in order for strict liability to attach. This
requirement is created in order to limit strict liability, to keep it
within some definable bounds, and to prevent it from becoming
absolute. The Court of Appeals has thus restricted the scope of strict
liability without openly appearing to do so, by purporting to define
the word "defect." It would seem far better to recognize the purpose
for the definition in order to properly deal with it. By holding that
the standard to be applied in product design cases is the manufacturer's negligence in producing that design, the incongruous result
is two separate and distinct tests for liability in defective products
cases. If the defect is shown to be the result of some malfunction in the
manufacturing process, the defendant is strictly liable, regardless of
his care or lack of it. However, if the defect is shown to be an unsafe
design, the defendant is liable only if the plaintiff can show that the
defendant was negligent in designing the product. The obvious
question is whether there is any valid reason for applying separate and

11 The Kentucky. Court of Appeals first accepted the language of the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A in Dealer's Transport Co. v. Battery Distributing
Co., 402 S.W.2d 441 (Ky. 1965) as being dispositive of Kentucky law bearing

upon the issue of manufacturer's liability for defective products.
'2Jones v. Hutchinson Manufacturing, Inc., 502 S.W.2d 66, 70 (Ky. 1973).
13 Id.at 70. § 398 states the standard developed by the Restatement for a
manufacturer's liability in an action based upon negligence: that standard is one
of reasonable care. § 402A, however, purports to impose strict liability in cases
where the product is "defective." The Court apparently intends § 402A to apply
only to "manufacturing" defects, and to apply § 398 (which antedates § 402A) to
"design' defects, although this is not entirely clear.
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distinct tests of liability in "design defect" and "manufacturing defect"
cases.14
II. HISTORICAL DEvELOPMENT OF STicr LiBrrY
The road to the present state of the law in products liability is
rather winding and has been often traveled by legal scholars. 15
Perhaps, however, by briefly touring it we can gain some insight as to
why the law has developed as it has.
The original rule was established in Winterbottom v. Wright 6
which held that a manufacturer owed no duty to anyone other than
the one to whom he sold his goods and would not be liable for injuries
resulting from defects in those goods except to the person with
whom he had dealt directly. When we consider that this case was
decided in the infancy of the Industrial Revolution, the reason for the
decision is clear. It was felt that fettering industry with the cost of
compensating victims of its products when the industry had not even
seen the individual who had been injured would be more than it
could bear. As industry progressed and proliferated, many more
people were being injured. The idea emerged that certain exceptions
to the general rule could be tolerated without fear of destroying the
Revolution. In Olds Motor Works v. Shaffer,17 the Court of Appeals
of Kentucky recognized one of these exceptions when it held that if
articles were "imminently dangerous" the manufacturer could be held
liable for injuries proximately resulting from its negligence even if the
injured party did not deal directly with the manufacturer. The Court
in Olds Motor Works used "imminently dangerous" to mean products
which were not inherently dangerous but which could still inflict
serious harm if defectively produced. In effect, the Court was laying
the groundwork for the landmark decision of MacPherson v. Buick

Motor Co.' when it argued that "[i]f an automobile is defective or
14 Justice Traynor, one of the first to recognize strict liability in tort in his
decision in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697
(1962) has stated his disapproval of the "variance from the norm" test that has
resulted in this dual result.
[Ilf a product is so dangerous as to inflict widespread harm, it is ironic to
exempt the manufacturer from liability on the ground that any other
sample of his product would produce like harm. If we scrutinize deviations from a norm of safety as a basis for imposing liabilit., should we
not scritinize all the more the product whose norm is danger.
His answer to this rhetorical question is an unqualified yes. Traynor, supra note 8,
at 368.
15 See generally Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel(Strict Liability to the
Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960); see also Keeton, supra note 2, at 560-61.

10 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
17 140 S.W. 1047 (Ky. 1911).
18 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916). Justice Cardozo even relied upon Olds Motor
Works for the proposition that an automobile is imminently dangerous.
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insufficiently constructed, there can be no doubt that it is an imminently
dangerous thing ....
19 Recognizing that industry must no longer
be permitted to avoid compensating the victims of its defective products, the Court allowed a party other than the purchaser to recover
by bringing his case within the exception to the rule of non-liability.
There are two reasons why this case did not become the landmark
case that MacPherson did. First, the Court brought the case within
the exception rather than expanding the rule to fit the case as did
Justice Cardozo in MacPherson; and, secondly, the Court based
liability upon fraud and deceit rather than upon negligence. 20 Thus
knowledge by the purchaser of the defect would defeat a non-purchaser's claim.
This set the stage for Justice Cardozo's statement in MacPherson
that any product which "is reasonably certain to place life and limb
in peril when negligently made" 21 would fit within the imminently
dangerous articles exception, thus causing the exception to swallow
up the rule. No longer was privity a bar in negligence actions. Kentucky soon accepted this broadened form of Olds Motor Works when,
in Payton's Administrator v. Childer's Electric Co.,22 the Court held
that when an article "which by reason of negligent construction is
manifestly dangerous when put to the use for which it is intended"
caused injury, the manufacturer was liable to any person who might
have suffered that injury.23 For the first time, protection of the consumer became a factor in determining the manufacturer's liability.
This desire to protect the consumer led courts to find new ways
to hold manufacturers responsible for injuries caused by their defective
products. This broadened interest in the protection of the consumer
found its first acceptance in food products cases, which became the
avenue for the expansion of products liability. Since sellers and manufacturers of food products for human consumption have always been
24
held to have a special responsibility to consumers of their products,
courts began to hold manufacturers of food products liable for injuries
caused by their products whether the plaintiff was able to show negligence or not. 25 Some courts held that this liability without proof of
negligence should attach even though the person injured did not buy
the food from the defendant. Thus a Mississippi court introduced the
19 Olds Motor Works v. Shaffer, 140 S.W. 1047, 1051 (Ky. 1911).

20

at 1052.
21 Id.
MacPherson

v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916).

14 S.W.2d 208 (Ky. 1929).
231d. at 210.
24 Prosser, supra note 15, at 1103.
25
22

Mazeti v. Armour & Co., 135 P. 638 (Wash. 1913).
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idea of a warranty of wholesomeness that ran with the title, analogous
to covenants running with title to land, based on the theory that the
26
manufacturer warranted that the food was pure and wholesome.
Rejecting defendant's argument that the warranty could not arise in
absence of privity between plaintiff and defendant, the court held that
the warranty was not based upon a contractual relationship, but instead was impliedly made to anyone holding the title and rightful
possession of the food.27 Therefore, the analysis extended to whether
plaintiff actually had title to the goods, i.e., by purchase or gift, or
whether he was merely in possession of the food. 28 This limited
expansion did not satisfy the courts, however. Other jurisdictions
extended strict liability, under a theory of warranty, to articles for
intimate bodily use, such as soap 29 and hair dye.30 Once the extension
was made, the theory of a special responsibility of food purveyors no
longer applied, and there was little difficulty in further extending the
warranty to other products.
The New Jersey Supreme Court, in an exceptionally exhaustive and
lucid opinion, laid the ideas of privity and negligence quietly to rest
in the case of Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 31 wherein they
declared that there was "no rational doctrinal basis" for applying
strict liability to a maker of soft drinks but not to an automobile
manufacturer.3 2 The only requirement was that the articles be "such
that if defectively manufactured they will be dangerous to life or
limb.. . ."3 If it were such an article, there was an implied warranty
that extended to any user of the product. It was at this point that
protecting "society's interests" 34 in compensation for injury from defective products finally tipped the scales in favor of the consumer. No
longer was the general rule one of non-liability. Consumer protection
had vaulted from a position of little or no importance into the forefront; once peripheral, it now dominated social policy.
California, however, saw one last problem to be conquered-the
contractual requirements that had grown up around warranty liability.
26 Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons, 111 So. 305 (Miss. 1927). However,
this idea was never accepted in Kentucky. The Court of Appeals insisted that

liability, "if any, must arise because of [the manufacturers] negligence under one

of the well-known exceptions to the usual rule .. " Nehi Bottling Co. v. Thomas,
33 S.W.2d 701, 703 (Ky. 1930).
27 Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons, 111 So. 305, 306 (Miss. 1927).
28 Id.at 307.
20
9 Kruper v. Procter & Gamble Co., 113 N.E.2d 605 (Ohio App. 1953), rev'd
on other
3 0 grounds, 117 N.E.2d 7 (Ohio 1954).
Graham v. Bottenfield's, Inc., 269 P.2d 413 (Kan. 1954).
3' 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1954).
32 Id. at 83.
33 Id.at 81.
34 Id.
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Though warranty first arose as a fiction to apply tort liability, it soon
found a base in sales law and became inextricably intertwined with
contract doctrines of notice, disclaimer, and limitation of actions. In
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,Inc.,3 5 Justice Traynor finally put
strict liability in its place, squarely in tort law. No longer could the
defendant escape liability because the injured plaintiff failed to notify
him or because the manufacturer disclaimed any implied warranties
in the sales contract. The rationale for the elimination of these
traditional defenses by the reclassification of the injured person's cause
of action was explained by Justice Traynor as follows:
The purpose of such liability is to insure that the costs of injuries
resulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturers
that put such products on the market rather than by the injured
persons who are powerless to protect themselves. 36
A part of this argument is based also upon the fact that the manufacturer is in a better position to absorb the costs and spread them
equitably as a cost of doing business. Other arguments used to support
strict tort liability are that in today's market situation, characterized
by national media advertising, the purchaser often is actually dealing
directly with the manufacturer rather than the manufacturer's dealers.
In addition, if recovery were based upon negligence, the purchaser
could recover only against the manufacturer (middle-men generally
only non-negligently funnel the products), over whom it is sometimes
difficult to obtain jurisdiction. Strict liability, on the other hand,
allows recovery against a middle-man who then can either recover
against the maker, distribute the cost as a cost of business, or put
economic pressure on the maker. Finally, improvement of the quality
of products and reduction of the number of injuries is a basic purpose
expressed by all proponents of strict liability. Under whatever theory
it is accomplished, it is clear that there is "a trend and a design in
legislative and judicial thinking toward providing protection for the
37
buyer."
This broadened form of strict liability found acceptance in the
Restatement as § 402A38 and in Kentucky in the case of Dealers
8 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962).

36
Id. at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
37
-enningson v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 77 (N.J. 1959).
8
3 RESTATEMET (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) reads in full:
§ 402A. Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User
or Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to
liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(Continued on next p~age)
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Transport Co., Inc. v. Battery Distributing Co., Inc.39 Kentucky reaffirmed its position that negligence no longer has a place in products
liability law when it declared, in Kroger Co. v. Bowman,40 that "the
liability exists even though [the manufacturer] has exercised all possible care.... "41
What this survey shows is a constant trend toward greater protection for the consumer and dissatisfaction with artificial limits upon
his ability to recover for injuries proximately resulting from defects
in manufacturers' products. Industry no longer needs protection; in
fact, it is better able than the person injured to bear the loss occasioned
by such injuries. For this reason the rules of non-liability, privity,
and negligence have been replaced as rules regarding recovery. The
ultimate goal is the protection of consumers from defective products,

III. STmcr Lrkmr,

TnE PmwcirE APPLIED IN Jones

This brief overview of the development of strict liability illustrates
the movement away from using standards of negligence to determine
liability. Yet, the Court of Appeals in Jones v. Hutchinson Manufacturing, Inc. 42 held that a manufacturer's liability is to be determined by applying negligence principles. This seems to be a long
step backwards historically and raises serious questions.
It could be argued that the Court has adopted a two-step approach to determining liability, applying § 402A strict liability to a
defective product whose defect is an unsafe design and using negligence concepts to determine if the product is "defective." It is possible that this interpretation is allowable under § 402A, since that
section says only that liability attaches when a defective product
causes injury; the section does not attempt to define when the product
is defective. This argument seems sound, but is deceptively simplistic. By using negligence theory to determine whether a product
is defective, the manufacturer is liable only when he has been negligent; he is liable only if there is a defect, and there is a defect only
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

of selling such a product,
and (a) the seller is engaged in the business
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or
entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
39 402 S.W.2d 441 (Ky. 1965).
40
411 S.W.2d 339 (Ky. 1967).
4
1 Id. at 341 (emphasis added).
42502 S.W.2d 66 (Ky. 1973).

KEN-mcKY LAw JouNAL[6

[Vol 62.

when he is negligent. The methodology and result are exactly the
same as if § 398 of the Restatement 43 were applied directly-which is
simply to apply negligence liability. To speak of applying strict liability
after using negligence theory to determine whether a defect exists is
simply to hide the truth behind verbiage. By applying negligence
theory in the determination of whether there is a defect, design defects
are removed from § 402A, and only manufacturing defects will subject
the manufacturer to strict liability. Thus the real issue is whether
there is sound reason to apply one test of liability where the alleged
defect is due to design and to apply another, dissimilar test where the
alleged defect is due to manufacture.
Many courts have held that design defect cases should not turn
on the issue of the manufacturer's negligence. The New Jersey Supreme
Court has held that "imposition of warranty or strict liability principles
to a case of defective design ...would render unnecessary any al,44 In Pennsylvania, actions based upon
legation of negligence .. ...

§ 402A strict liability are governed by the evidentiary standards of
warranty, which have long abandoned negligence. 45 As noted earlier,
the principal reason negligence was replaced by strict liability was
because of increased emphasis on consumer protection; accordingly,
the Minnesota Supreme Court has declared that strict liability in
design defect cases "more adequately meets public policy demands
to protect consumers from ...

risks of bodily harm created by mass

production.... .,46
Moreover, there is no policy reason to differentiate between design
defects and defects resulting from manufacture. As discussed above,
the primary reason for adopting strict liability in tort grew out of a
policy decision "to protect against unreasonable risk of physical
harm while the product is used for its intended purposes,"47 and a
OF TORTS § 398 (1965) was included in the Re43 RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
statement before strict liability was adopted by the Restatement and states the
rule of manufacturer's liability as it was developed in negligence. In some respects,
§ 402A supersedes § 398 by its very terms, because negligence is no longer necessary under § 402A. Not all jurisdictions have adopted § 402A, however, and even
in those jurisdictions which have, there remains an action based upon negligence
where such can be shown. § 398 reads in full:
§ 398. Chattel Made Under Dangerous Plan or Design A manufacturer of
a chattel made under a plan or design which makes it dangerous for the
uses for which it is manufactured is subject to liability to others whom he
should expect to use the chattel or to be endangered by its probable use

for physical harm caused by his failure to exercise reasonable care in the
adoption of a safe plan or design.
44Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, 207 A.2d 314, 326 (N.J. 1964).
45

MacDougall v. Ford Motor Co., 257 A.2d 676, 678 (Pa. 1969).
v. Hankscraft Co., 154 N.W.2d 488, 500 (Minn. 1967).

40 McCormack
47Id.at 496.
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determination that the manufacturer was in the best position to absorb
the costs of any such physical harm which it could recoup as a cost
of doing business.48 These reasons are found in defective design cases
to the same extent as in defective manufacture cases. Where a whole
product line is involved in a defective design case, the potential for
harm is multiplied, and the policy of consumer protection that underlies the theory of strict liability would suggest that strict liability has
even greater application here.
In Pizza Inn, Inc. v. Tiffany,49 an employee at a pizzaria caught
his hand in a device that rolled out pizza dough. The court refused to
apply the test of reasonable care to the failure to provide adequate
guards to protect the hands of the user,50 stating that "there is no
adequate rationale to apply the rule of strict liability in a defect in
manufacture case, but deny it in a defect of design case."3' To require
the plaintiff to show negligence in the development of the design in
question is to deny recovery, except to those few who are able to hire
the proper experts and amass the multitudinous evidence necessary
to persuade a jury that the elaborate precautions employed by the
manufacturer did not measure up to the standard of reasonable care. 52
Such a requirement would undermine the purpose of strict liability,
which is to "[meet] public demands to protect consumers," 53 and is
also inappropriate because under the doctrine of strict liability, the
manufacturer's fault (or lack of it) in the production of the unsafe
product is not a factor to be considered. 54
The Court of Appeals in Jones also failed to note that, in determining the defective condition, the drafters of the Second Restatement contemplated looking to the safety of the product involved,
rather than to the acts or omissions by the manufacturer in production. 5 One commentator has said that "the entire emphasis in cases
interpreting section 402A, therefore, is on safety . . . ,51" Thus, the
important factor is how safe or dangerous the product is when used
as it was intended to be used.
Keeton, supra note 2, at 561.
49 454 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970).
GO Id. at 423.
512 Id.
U McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 154 N.W.2d 488, 500 (Minn. 1967).
G3 Id. at 500.
G4 The Restatement intends for strict liability to apply even though "the seller
has exercised all possible care." Given this statement, it is difficult to see how fault
could be a factor. Generally, applying negligence standards at least implies that
one who does not meet the standards is "at fault." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
ToRTs § 402A(2)(a) (1965). For the full text see note 38 supra.
48

65 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment g (1965).
U; Comment, Products Liability-StrictLiability in Torts, 11 DUQuESNE L. rEv.

726, 728 (1973).
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In Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp.,5 7 the Supreme Court of California
sought to completely abolish the application of negligence concepts to
actions based upon design defects. In that case the driver of a bread
van was injured when a latch failed to hold the bread racks in place
during a collision, and the bread racks forced the plaintiff-driver
of the van through the windshield. Justice Sullivan sought to remove
all considerations of negligence by making it clear that in California
a product need not be "unreasonably dangerous" in order for the
plaintiff to recover. By removing the requirement that the product be
"unreasonably dangerous," the California court effectively precluded
negligence theory from becoming a determinative factor in assessing
liability. As long as the product is defective, the plaintiff suffers
injury as a proximate result of that defect, and the product was not
being used improperly, the plaintiff may recover. 58 This result is
logically consistent with the public policy arguments which gave rise
to the doctrine of strict liability originally, and it prevents the concept
of negligence from creeping back into products liability cases. As
Justice Sullivan ably points out, the manufacturer is sufficiently protected by the requirement that the damages occur proximately from a
defect.59 This puts the burden on the plaintiff to show that there is a
defect in the product and that the defect was the proximate cause of
his injuries. The concept of strict liability was engendered in an effort
to shift losses caused by defective products to the manufacturer which
produced the defective goods in order to protect unwary consumers
who were in no position to control the quality of goods.
It should be remembered that the purpose of requiring the plaintiff
to prove a defect is merely to prevent strict liability from becoming
absolute. However, the Kentucky Court's failure in Jones to recognize
that this is merely a limiting device leads it to seek a definition of
defect as an end in itself, and causes it to overlook the effect of the
definition as a limiting factor. If the effect is to add elements to the
plaintiff's case, those additional elements should be justifiable. When
the definition as a limiting factor is too efficient, when it limits to a
degree beyond that which is necessary, its use should be re-evaluated.
In practice, strict liability with overtones of negligence rarely
57501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972).
58 Id. at 1162.
59 Id. Justice Sullivan argues that the manufacturer should be held liable for
injury proximately resulting from a defect in its product. resulting
This means
usewhile
of itsa
fromthat
manufacturer should not be held liable for all injuries
product (which would make it an insurer of users of its product), it should be
liable for injury occurring as a proximate result of a defect in its product. This
requirement of a showing of proximate result from a defect sufficiently distinguishes

between the cases when liability should attach and those in which it should not.
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leads to a different conclusion than that which would have been
reached under pure negligence theories, 0 which is directly contrary
to the purpose of strict liability. This principle, that negligence should
not be allowed to creep back into actions based upon strict liability,
was expressed by the Appellate Court of Illinois in Wright v. MasseyHarris,Inc.,61 in which liability was determined by asking ".... whether

the product in question
safety."6 2 To determine
court correctly looked to
the acts of the defendant.

has lived up to the required standard of
whether the product was "defective," the
the condition of the product rather than to
The test is "danger in fact, as that danger is

found to be at the time of the trial, that controls." 63 Therefore, proof of

the manufacturer's negligence has no place in an action based upon
64
defective design.
In the Jones opinion the Kentucky Court of Appeals placed heavy
emphasis upon a quotation from Prosser which suggests that the test of
defective design is the manufacturer's negligence:
There are, in addition, two particular areas in which the liability
of the manufacturer, even though it may occasionally be called
strict, appears to rest primarily upon a departure from proper standards of care, so that the tort is essentially a matter of negligence.
One of these involves the design of the product .... 05
Since Prosser was the principal draftsman of § 402A of the Restatement,
his opinion concerning the test to be employed thereunder in defective
design cases should carry great weight. If read in isolation, this
quote does indeed suggest that Prosser thought negligence to be the
proper standard for design defect cases. A more careful reading of
the entire section, however, discloses that Prosser is not discussing
strict liability at all; he is discussing the proper standards in actions
brought upon negligence theonj. Negligence and strict liability in
tort are treated separately in the hornbook from which the quotation
is taken,6 6 and this quote does not concern the standards involved in
60 Cf. Rheingold, Proof of Defect in Product Liability Cases, 38 TENN. L. REV.
325, 326 ( 1971).

61 215 N.E.2d 466 (IMI.App. Ct. 1966).
621d.
at 470.
O3 Keeton, supra note 2, at 568.

04 Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 207 A.2d 305, 313 (N.J. 1965).

65 Jones v. Hutchinson Mfg., Inc., 502 S.W.2d 66, 69 (Ky. 1973), citing W.

Pnossm, LAW%OF TORTS 644 (4th ed. 1971).
60 Prosser addressed the recovery problems a plaintiff faces in a defective
products case based upon a theory of negligence in § 96 of his book, which section
is appropriately entitled Negligence. The cause of action based upon strict liability
in tort is discussed in a separate section, § 98, which also is appropriately
entitled Strict Liability in Tort. Prosser's approach is to analyze these bases for
recovery independently because, though they sometimes involve overlapping proof,
(Continued on next page)
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strict liability in tort. Prosser is saying merely that even though strict
liability exists, many attorneys also allege negligence, which still has
a place in products liability law.67 This statement clearly relates only
to negligence actions, and the casual reference to the fact that strict
liability also exists does not mean that this is the standard to be used
in strict liability actions. When specifically discussing strict liability
in relation to unsafe products, Prosser asserts that "strict liability,
whether on warranty or in tort, does not require negligence ...f"s
Therefore, Prosser did not think that the manufacturer's negligence
should be the test to determine whether a defect exists; to the contrary, he says that a requirement of negligence is entirely out of place
in an action based upon strict liability in tort.

IV. TowARD A BETr=m

STANAmED

In strict liability cases there must be an affirmative showing of a
defect, which has given rise to the subordinate problem of defining
exactly what constitutes a defect. This requirement seems to stem
from a fear that strict liability may force a manufacturer to compensate any user of its products who becomes injured by such use. This
fear was reflected in the evolution of strict liability theory; liability
was never meant to attach unless there actually was a defect. But
requiring a showing of negligence in product design cases imposes
an unnecessarily severe limitation on a plaintiffs right to recover in
order to achieve that result. It seems clear that the courts have not
approached design defects as conceptually different from manufacturing defects; therefore, the goal of limiting liability to a case
in which a defect can be shown should not subject design cases to a
different basis for liability. Rather, protection for the manufacturer
can be obtained in other ways, which would allow both manufacture
and design cases to be treated as conceptually alike. A definition of
defect should be developed which would apply equally well in either
the design defect or manufacturing defect cases.
In developing such a definition, two important factors should be
kept in mind. First the definition must focus upon the condition of
the particular instrumentality in question. Secondly, the definition
must recognize that certain products, although dangerous, are con(Footnote continued from preceding page)

they are conceptually separate and distinct. For an analysis of the three separate
bases for recovery (negligence, implied warranty, and strict liability in tort) see
W. PRossmR, LAW OF TORTS §§ 96-98, at 641-57 (4th ed. 1971).
07 Cf. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 641-42 (4th ed. 1971). Prosser points out

that by alleging negligence it is possible to introduce evidence of negligence which
tends to affect the size of the jury's verdict on damages.
68 Id. at 661 (emphasis added).

CoN24=s
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sidered valuable enough to society to be used notwithstanding their
dangerous nature.69 An excellent example of such a definition was
developed by the Illinois Supreme Court in Dunham v. Vaughn &
Bushnell Manufacturing Co.,70 in which the court held that "those
products are defective which are dangerous because they fail to perform in the manner reasonably to be expected in light of their nature
and intended function." 71 This test puts proper emphasis on the condition of the product as the controlling factor and uses consumer
expectation, as suggested by the Restatement,72 to protect products of
high utility. Another definition of defect, worded only slightly differently, could be: those products are defective which are in fact dangerous to an extent greater than could reasonably be expected in light
of their nature and function, giving due weight to the high social
utility of certain products, such as drugs and medicines, and to the
feasibility of making the product safer. Such a definition would sufficiently protect products of high social utility and would prevent
manufacturers from being insurers of users of their products. At the
same time, it would place greater emphasis upon the reasonable
expectations of consumers for one primary reason: strict liability
theory evolved as a device to protect consumers, and the consumer
needs protection only from those products which are more dangerous
than can reasonably be expected. If the product in question is
dangerous, but no more so than can be expected, such as a knife or
ax, the consumer can take steps to protect himself. However, if the
product is dangerous beyond a consumer's expectation, he cannot be
expected to protect himself from it. This definition, then, would give
the manufacturer sufficient protection and would be consistent with
the theory behind strict liability. The manufacturer would be liable
only when he produced an instrumentality which was more dangerous
than a reasonable consumer should have expected and which was
69 This was the policy factor behind the "unreasonably dangerous" language of
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTS § 402A, comment i

§ 402A originally (see

(1965)) and was what Prosser, the primary draftsman of that section, was concerned with in his discussion of the possible deterrent effect on the drug industry of
holding manufacturers liable for any dangerous product. See W. PRossER, LAw OF
TORTS 661 (4th ed. 1971).
70247 N.E.2d 401 (IM. 1969).
71Id.at 403.
72 See

RESTATEMENT

(SEcoND)

OF TORTS

§ 402A, comment g (1965):

The rule stated in this section applies only when the product is... in a
condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which will be
unreasonably dangerous to him (emphasis added).
And see RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment i (1965):
The article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would
be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it . ...
(emphasis added).
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more dangerous than it needed to be. At the same time the consumer
would be protected from products which were "unreasonably dangerous." In addition, the definition would work equally well whether
the dangerous condition is due to a malfunction in the manufacturing
process or due to a design that is unsafe.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Court's reliance upon negligence theory as a limiting factor in
strict liability recoveries introduces another element into the plaintiffs
case which is both unnecessary and inconsistent with the theory of
strict liability. If the goal is to prevent recovery when in fact no defect
exists, this can be reached by methods which conform to the policies
underlying strict liability in tort. On the other hand, if the reason
for the introduction of negligence as a factor was actually a dissatisfaction with the results of the adoption of strict liability, then
Dealer's Transport should have been squarely overruled. Unless and
until the Court chooses to reverse its current thinking, strict liability
will only be strict in Kentucky when the defect complained of is a
result of the manufacturing process. Defects designed into the products
will not give rise to strict liability; only when the manufacturer is
negligent in adopting the design will he be liable for injuries proximately resulting from that "defect."
Charles R. Keeton

